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Abstract Next Generation Networks is a convergence
of networks such as 2G/3G, WLAN as well as the re-
cently implemented Long Term Evolution (LTE) net-
works. Future mobile devices will switch between these
different networks to maintain the connectivity with
end servers. However, to support these heterogeneous
environments, there is a need to consider a new design
of the network infrastructure, where currently closed
systems such as 3G will have to operate in an open
environment. Security is a key issue in this open en-
vironment; after authenticating the mobile terminal to
access the network, there is a requirement for service-
level mechanisms to protect the session between the mo-
bile terminal and the remote service provider. Further-
more, since mobile terminals switch between networks
of different characteristics in terms of coverage, Quality
of Service and security, there is a need for re-assessing
the security of the same session over the different net-
works to comply with the changes at the network level
due to the mobility. Therefore, this paper introduces a
Service-Level Authentication and Key Agreement pro-
tocol to secure the session between the mobile terminal
and the end server. The proposed protocol considers
user mobilities in an heterogeneous environment and
reassesses the session’s security level in case of han-
dover. The proposed protocol has been verified using
formal methods approach based on the well-established
Casper/FDR compilers.
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1 Introduction
We are currently experiencing huge development and
large-scale deployment of several wireless technologies;
from next generation cellular networks to personal/home
networks such as WLANs and metropolitan ones such
as WiMax and LTE. Since the peripheral networks are
mainly wireless, they will be of an entirely different na-
ture to the network in the core network and thus will
have hugely different characteristics in terms of latency,
bandwidth and error rate.
Therefore, it will not be possible to think of the fu-
ture Internet as a single unified structure; future Inter-
net could be viewed as comprising of a fast core network
with slower peripheral networks attached around the
core. The core network will consist of a super-fast back-
bone using optical switches and fast access networks
which uses Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS), and
it will be an open architecture not under the control of
a specific mobile operator rather various network op-
erators will coexist in the core network and provide
their services. This view emphasises the heterogeneous
and open nature of future Next Generation Networks
(NGNs), where users will expect to switch between dif-
ferent access networks using handover techniques while
maintaining the connectivity to various application Ser-
vice Providers (SPs) that provides a wide variety of
services such as e-Commerce, on-line banking and elec-
tronic public services in addition to video/news on-
demand, Grid and Cloud resources/services. This sit-
uation is shown in Fig 1.
This new open architecture, will bring about new se-
curity threats in terms of authenticating and authoriz-
ing the mobile terminal to access the network and con-
tact the application Service Provider (SP). Therefore,
there is a need to secure the transactions whether at
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Fig. 1 Ubiquitous Connectivity via Vertical Handover
the network or at the service or application levels. While
the first has been addressed by different research efforts
such as [1] [2] [3] [4]. Furthermore, in a recent work of
our research group two Authentication and Key Agree-
ment (AKA) protocols have been proposed to provide
security at the network level [5]. However, few research
efforts such as [6] [27] [8] have been dealing with the se-
curity at the service level, considering the open nature
of the future networks.
This paper introduces a novel Service-Level AKA
(SL-AKA) protocol that considers the open architec-
ture of future networks [35] and achieves mutual au-
thentication between the MT and the SP in the initial
stage when the MT contacts the SP for the first time as
well as in the case of handover, when the MT changes its
point of attachment while maintains the connectivity to
the SP. The proposed protocol is verified using formal
methods such as Communication Sequential Processes
(CSP) [11], which is a formal language to describe the
interaction and states in concurrent systems, it has been
used to model communicating and security protocols as
in [12] and [13]. To verify the CSP models, model check-
ers such as the Failure Divergence Refinement (FDR)
[14] is used. Although modelling and verifying security
protocols using CSP and FDR have proven to be ef-
fective and widely deployed, modelling directly in CSP
is a time-consuming and error-prone. Therefore, a new
compiler for generating the CSP description of the pro-
tocol was designed by Lowe in [15]. The new complier
is called Casper and it accepts an abstract description
of a system and translates it into CSP. This paper will
model the security properties of the proposed protocols
using Casper and analyse the CSP output with FDR.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 describes a potential structure of future, hetero-
geneous networks as introduced by different research
frameworks such as Daidalos II and Y-Comm research
groups [16] [17]. Section 3 defines the challenges of pro-
Fig. 2 The Structure of Future Internet
viding the service-level security in the heterogeneous
environment. Related works to address the security at
the service-level are discussed in Section 4. While Sec-
tion 5 describes the approach followed in this paper
to analyse the proposed security protocols, Section 6
presents the proposed SL-AKA protocols for the initial
authentication as well as authentication in case of the
handover. The paper concludes in Section 7.
2 Overview of Future Network Structure
Current systems such as 2nd and 3rd generations are
considered as closed ones due to the fact that the core
network is owned by a sole operator, who is responsible
for managing all aspects of communication including
security and QoS provision. However, as explained in
section 1, the heterogeneity of future networks leads
to a new open architecture of the core network, where
the infrastructure is not controlled by a single operator
rather multiple operators coexist in the core network.
To deal with the interoperability issue between the dif-
ferent operators, the Y-Comm group and the Daidalos
II [17] [16] adopted and enhanced the concept of a cen-
tral management entity, as proposed in [18], to control
the different operators. And hence, the concept of the
Core End-Point (CEP) as a central administrative do-
main that controls the operation of different network
operators was introduced.
As shown in Fig 2, the future Internet could be
viewed as composed of several Core End-Points, inter-
connected over the super-fast backbone of the Internet.
Each CEP is responsible for managing multiple, wire-
less peripheral networks such as Wimax, WiFi or cellu-
lar technologies.
A detailed view of the network along with its com-
ponents are explained in [17] and shown in Fig 3. It
is a hierarchical structure of the network composed of
three levels. The top level is the Core End-Point (CEP)
which acts as a gateway to the Internet and is respon-
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sible for managing multiple, mid-level domains. Each
domain is technology-specific and is controlled by a
single operator. For instance the CEP might be con-
nected to two domains; each is controlled by different
technology operator such as WiMAX and GSM. The
bottom level is the peripheral wireless networks, repre-
sented by multiple Access Routers (ARs), which make
the interface between the network and the mobile ter-
minal (MT). The communication between the CEPs
takes place over the backbone of the Internet where
architectures like the Intermon [19], which is a research
framework to facilitate Inter-domain QoS monitoring
and analysis for validation, planning and optimisation
of inter-domain QoS, could be used to manage the com-
munication among CEPs. However, the research in this
paper is not concerned with discussing inter-CEPs com-
munication framework.
In order to deal with the QoS and security tasks in
this architecture, a number of operational entities have
been proposed as follows:
– The Central A3C server (CA3C): This is the
central Authentication, Authorization; Accounting
and Cost (A3C) server in the Core End-Point. The
CA3C holds the Service Level of Agreements (SLAs)
along with the Network Level of Agreements (NLAs),
which describe the clients’ term of use of the service
and access networks, respectively.
– The Central QoS Broker (CQoSB): is respon-
sible for negotiating QoS in case of cross-CEP han-
dover.
– The Domain A3C Server (DA3C): The DA3C
is responsible for handling users’ service aspects. Ini-
tially, it extracts users’ profile information from the
CA3C and uses this information for authorizing the
users’ requests to access services.
– The Domain QoS Broker (DQoSB): manages
the resources of the attached peripheral networks
with respect user preferences and network availabil-
ity, it also makes a per-flow admission control deci-
sion.
– The Access Router (AR): This is the link be-
tween the domain and the peripheral networks; it
enforces the admission control decision, taken by the
DQoSB. Since the AR acts as a relay between the
Mobile Terminal (MT) in the peripheral network
and the DA3C, using security terminology, the AR
will be referred to as the Authenticator (Auth).
The proposed network architecture supports two dif-
ferent business models as follows:
1. The Cellular Model: In this model, a single network
operator manages both a core network and wireless
access, such as the 3G, WLAN and 4G.
Fig. 3 The Future Network Structure
Table 1 Supporting LTE Networks using the discussed Hi-
erarchical Architecture
The LTE Net-
work Element
The Corresponding Network En-
tity
The Home
Subscriber
Server (HSS)
The Central A3C Server (CA3C)
and the Central QoS Broker
(CQoSB)
The Policy
Control and
Charging
Rules Func-
tion (PCRF)
The High-level Access Admission
Decision module (HAAD) of the
CQoSB
The Policy
Control En-
forcement
Func- tion
(PCEF)
The Access Admission Deci-
sion (AAD) and the Cen- tral-
ized Network Monitoring Entity
(CNME) modules of the DQoSB
The PDN
Gateway
(P-GW)
The Domain QoS Broker
(DQoSB) and the Domain A3C
(DA3C) server
The Serv-
ing Gateway
(S-GW)
The Access Admission Enforce-
ment (AAE) and Net- work
Monitor Entity (NME) modules
of the Access Router
The eNB and
the MME
The Access Router
2. The Collaboration Model: Here, the core network
and each wireless access are managed by different
operators.
Furthermore, in a recent work of our group in [9],
we discussed how this hierarchical architecture could
be used to support new technologies such as LTE and
Wimax. By Considering the architecture of LTE net-
works as detailed in [10], Table shows the mapping be-
tween the two architectures.
3 Problem Definition
The aim of ubiquitous computing in heterogeneous en-
vironments such as the one described in the previous
section is to provide mobile users anytime, anywhere
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Fig. 4 The Two-Level Security
and any platform access to a wide variety of comput-
ing servers. While much research has been performed
to provide the infrastructure and mechanisms support
for this goal at the network such as Mobile IPv6, Fast
Mobile IPv6 and IEEE802.21 [20] [21] [3], few research
efforts such as the [6] have considered the need for ap-
plication supports for connectivity. As shown in Fig 4,
from a security perspective, this situation highlights
the need for addressing the security at two levels; the
Network-Level between the MT and the network oper-
ators, and the Service-level between the MT and the
application service providers.
Furthermore, the issue of Application Service-Level
security has in general been difficult to address in fu-
ture networks. This is due to many reasons. Firstly, any
proposed security protocol has to consider the structure
of current mobile devices as well as their limitations in
terms of battery and processing power. These condi-
tions put extra restrictions when deciding on security
measurements such as encryption algorithms (Symmet-
ric or Asymmetric) as well as keys management.
Secondly, current security mechanisms consider the
closed nature of current communication systems such
as 2nd and 3rd generation networks. According to this
nature, the resources of core network are controlled and
managed by a sole operator and thus, the core network
will be physically secure. Unlike the closed architecture
of current systems, the future network represents an
open, heterogeneous environment where multiple net-
work operators and application service providers exist
in the core network. These differences highlight the need
for enhancing current security mechanism if not intro-
ducing new ones that consider the open architecture of
the future networks.
Thirdly, when a client subscribes to services, param-
eters such as the desired QoS and security parameters
will be defined as part of the Service Level of Agree-
ment (SLA). However, since the service provider might
have different preferences in terms of the security and
QoS, the two end-points might need to provide a range
of preferences where they could negotiate the required
level of security. This highlights the need for a negotia-
tion stage to specify the connection parameters before
setting up the connection.
Fourthly, in heterogeneous networks, future mobile
devices are expected to switch between various access
networks while maintain connected to the service provider.
Based on their security characteristics, a server providers
might choose to trust some networks more than others
and hence apply different security measurements. This
highlights the need for the server providers to know
about the access network of the mobile terminal in or-
der to re-assess the connection security and to decide
on the required security parameters.
However, in the case of handover when the mobile
terminal moves into a new network with different char-
acteristics in terms of security and QoS, vertical han-
dover will therefore have an impact on the network ser-
vice experienced by ongoing applications and services
as mobile terminals move around. This implies that in
case of handover there is a need for re-negotiating the
connection parameters to comply with the character-
istics of the new access network. This highlights the
need for a lightweight Authentication and Key Agree-
ment (AKA) protocol for handover so the functionality
of the this protocol will not disrupt the connection with
the server.
4 Related Work
The literature is very rich with AKA protocols that
operate at the network-level and provide mutual au-
thentication between the mobile device and the access
network such as in [36] [37] [38] [39]. However, fewer
protocols have been introduced to address security at
the service level in heterogeneous environment. This
section describes some potential mechanisms to address
the Service-Level security in future networks.
4.1 Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL)
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor, Se-
cure Sockets Layer (SSL), are cryptographic protocols
that provide secure communication between two end
points over the Internet. SSL is divided into two lay-
ers, with each layer using services provided by a lower
layer and providing functionality to higher layers. The
SSL record layer provides confidentiality, authenticity,
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and re-play protection over a connection-oriented re-
liable transport protocol such as TCP. Layered above
the record layer is the SSL handshake protocol, a key-
exchange protocol which initializes and synchronizes
cryptographic state at the two endpoints. After the key-
exchange protocol completes, sensitive application data
can be sent via the SSL record layer [22]. In this sense,
SSL/TLS enables the end-points to negotiate and agree
on security parameters such as the encryption and hash-
ing algorithms.
Using public-key encryption techniques, SSL-enabled
client and server will authenticate each other and es-
tablish an encrypted connection. Although SSL/TLS
achieve many desired security properties, and as a re-
sult have been widely implemented, there are many
issues when it comes to implementing them in future
networks; firstly, they are PKI-based protocols and the
fact that setting- up a PKI is a complex and costly pro-
cess that consists of several steps: registration of users,
generation of keys, issuance and distribution of certifi-
cates. Additionally, PKI involves other complex pro-
cesses such as certificate retrieval and certification path
construction and validation makes it unsuitable for nor-
mal mobile terminals [23]. Furthermore, the complexity
of the PKI operation will add extra burden on the au-
thentication process in the case of handover. Secondly,
The SSL/TLS run above the Transport layer which
make them unaware of the characteristics of the un-
derlying access networks. And thus cannot reflect these
characteristics in the negotiation stage of the protocol.
Thirdly, these protocols do not introduce a lightweight
extension for re-authentication in case of handover.
4.2 The Stream Control Transmission Protocol
(SCTP)
The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [24]
is a connection-oriented transport protocol that oper-
ates on the top of the IP protocol. The SCTP has sev-
eral advantages over the traditional transport protocol
such as Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [25] and
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [26], examples of these
advantages are multi-streaming and multi-homing sup-
port. Additionally, the Secure SCTP (SSCTP) [6] [27]
was designed with security features to set a secure asso-
ciation between the two end-points and thus addresses
attacks such replay and SYN flooding. The SSCTP pro-
tocol enables the two end-points to negotiate the se-
curity parameters and thus agree on the desired algo-
rithms.
However, the security approach proposed of the Se-
cure SCTP is highly dependent on the SCTP protocol
as the underlying transport protocol and consequently,
it cannot be used with other transport protocols such as
the widely implemented TCP and the UDP. Although
the SCTP protocol supports client mobility [28], there
is neither a clear indication of the impact of this mo-
bility on the security mechanisms nor a lightweight re-
authentication protocol in case of handover.
4.3 The Service-Level AKA Protocol of the Mobile
Ethernet framework
The Mobile Ethernet framework [8] [29] is an architec-
ture for IP-based, future networks. In order to address
the security between the mobile terminal and the ser-
vice provider,an SL-AKA protocol was introduced in
[8].
Although the Mobile Ethernet framework, and thus
its security protocols, adopts a network structure that is
very similar to our view of future networks in section 2,
and despite the fact that the SL-AKA protocol achieves
a set of desired security features such as mutual authen-
tication and connection confidentiality, it suffers from
some major drawbacks. These are as follows: firstly, the
SL-AKA protocol does not have a negotiation stage;
thus, it neither considers the variation of QoS and se-
curity requirements of the access networks and the ser-
vice provider nor the client preference. Secondly, it does
not consider the case of handover and thus no SL-AKA
protocol for handover has been proposed.
5 Verifying Security Protocols
5.1 Verifying Security Protocols Using Formal
Methods and Casper/FDR Tool
Analysing security protocol using formal methods goes
through two stages. Firstly, modelling the protocol us-
ing a theoretical notation or language such as Com-
munication Sequential Processes (CSP) [11]. Secondly,
verifying the protocol using a model checker such as
Failures-Divergence Refinement (FDR) [14].
However, describing a system or a protocol using
CSP is a quite difficult and error-prone task; therefore,
Gavin Lowe [15] has developed CASPER tool to model
security protocols, it accepts a simple and human-friendly
input file that describes the system and compiles it into
CSP code which is then checked using the FDR model
checker. CASPER’s input file consists of eight headers
as explained in Table 2. Examples of the assertions that
could be checked in the #Specifications header are ex-
plained when discussing the formal verification of the
proposed protocol in section 6.1.2.
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Table 2 Casper’s Input File
The Header Description
#Free Vari-
ables
Defines the agents, variables and
functions in the protocol
#Processes Represents each agent as a pro-
cess
#Protocol
Description
Shows all the messages ex-
changed between the agents
#Specification Specifies the security properties
to be checked
#Actual Vari-
ables
Defines the real variables, in the
actual system to be checked
#Functions Defines all the functions used in
the protocol
#System Lists the agents participating in
the actual system with their pa-
rameters instantiated
#Intruder In-
formation
Specifies the intruder’s knowl-
edge and capabilities
Model checking is a fully automated analysis of prop-
erties of a finite state system called here the model. In
the case of CSP, the property as well as the commu-
nicating system are expressed as CSP processes. If a
property checks positively for a model this means that
the behaviour of the specified system does respect the
property. This check is equivalent to a mathematical
proof relative to the model since all possible traces of
the system are checked by the model checking proce-
dure. Therefore it is superior to testing. Nevertheless,
the process depends a lot on the right level of abstrac-
tion since the complexity of the checking is exponential
in the number of the state components of the model.
On the other side, in particular with security protocol
these abstraction have to be carefully checked at speci-
fication time (by the specifier/modeller) since they im-
plicitly carry all the guarantees about keys, intruder
knowledge etc. A great advantage of Model checking as
compared to other automated verification techniques
like Automated Theorem Proving is the possibility to
generate counterexamples. If a model (for example of a
protocol) is faulty (or allows an attack) this will show
when trying to verify a corresponding property. The
model checking process is such that it provides a path
through the finite state graph representing the model
that leads from an initial state to a state where the
property in question is violated. For a protocol, for ex-
ample, this path represents a possible attack. This is
how attacks can be discovered on protocols. In general,
it make model checking a tool suitable for an iterated
process using a feedback loop of stepwise development
as it is common in engineering disciplines.
5.2 Analysing the Security Protocols
To verify SL-AKA protocols, we use a form of formal
methods approach based on Casper/FDR tool [15]. The
Casper tool accepts an abstract, human-friendly de-
scription of the system and compiles it into Commu-
nication Sequential Processes (CSP) code, suitable for
the Failures-Divergence Refinement (FDR) [14] checker.
Furthermore, as stated in [30], it is desired for AKA
protocols to meet certain security properties. Therefore,
a list of these properties will be used to analyse the
security features of all the proposed AKA protocols.
The properties are as follows:
1. Mutual Entity Authentication: This is achieved when
each party is assured of the identity of the other
party.
2. Mutual Key Authentication: This is achieved when
each party is assured that no other party aside from
a specifically identified second party gains access to
a particular secret key.
3. Mutual Key Confirmation: This requirement means
that each party should be ensured that the other
has possession of a particular secret key.
4. Key Freshness : a key is considered fresh if it can
be guaranteed to be new and not reused through
actions of either an adversary or authorized party.
5. Unknown-Key Share resilience: In this attack the
two parties compute the same session key but have
different views of their peers in the key exchange.
In other words, in this attack an entity A ends up
believing she shares a key with B, although this is
the case, B mistakenly believes the key is instead
shared with an entity E 6= A.
6. Key Compromise Impersonation Resilience: This prop-
erty implies that if the Intruder compromised the
long-term key of one party, he should not be able to
masquerade to the party as a different party.
6 The Proposed SL-AKA Protocol and Key
Hierarchy
By considering the network structure in section 2, upon
signing the initial contract, the user’s profile informa-
tion including a Unique Key (UK), the Service Level of
Agreement (SLA) along with the subscribed services is
shared between the Centralized A3C (CA3C) in the ad-
ministrative domain and the subscriber. Similar to the
AKA protocols in GSM, UMTS and LTE [31] [32] [33]
where a secret key is burnt onto the SIM card of the
mobile device and is shared with the Authentication
Server, our proposed protocol presumes the existence
of such a secret key which will be referred to as the
Service-Level AKA Protocol for Heterogeneous Networks 7
Fig. 5 The Key Hierarchy
Unique Key (UK). This UK will be burnt onto the SIM
card of the mobile device and will only be used to derive
further keys, in other words it will not be used to en-
crypt/decrypt any messages, which means that it will
not be exposed to intruders. Furthermore, as has ini-
tially been highlighted in [32] and then analysed in [34]
and [5], it is crucial to secure the communication in the
core network to provide security in an open and hetero-
geneous environment like the one described in section 2.
Therefore, secure connections using VPN or IPSec pro-
tocols have to be set between the operational network
entities in the core network to protect their transac-
tions. Our proposed SL-AKA protocol will presumes
the presence of such security mechanisms when consid-
ering the communications in the core network.
As shown in Fig 5, a service-specific secret key
(Srvkey) is derived by the Mobile Terminal and the
CA3C which will securely pass it to the intended ap-
plication Service Provider (SP). The Srvkey is derived
using the UK, service ID (SrvID); the user’s subscrip-
tion ID (SubID) and a lifetime value as follow: Srvkey=
F1(UK, SrvID, SubID, lifetime). Using the Srvkey and
other information, an Association Key ASKey is de-
rived by the MT and the SP to protect the session be-
tween them. When MTs change the access network due
to handover, a new ASKey is derived to reflect the se-
curity level of the new network as will be explained in
section 6.1.1.
6.1 The Initial SL-AKA Protocol
This protocol runs when the Mobile Terminal (MT)
initially expresses its intention to contact the Service
Provider (SP) to achieve mutual authentication and set
up a secure channel between the MT and the SP.
Considering the network structure in section 2 and
as explained in [5], the information about the subscribed
services and the client’s preference of security along
Table 3 Notation
Abbreviation Full name and description
MT Mobile Terminal
SP Application Service
providers residing in the
core end point
DesDA3C The Domain AAAC server of
the destination (SP) domain
CA3C Central AAAC server stores
the MT’s SLA, which con-
tains the MT’s preferred QoS
and Security parameters as
well as the a list of all the
SPs.
Srvkey(SP) Service key: a pre-shared key
between the MT and the
SP: Srvkey= F1(UK, SrvID,
SubID, lifetime).
r1,r2 Random nonce
HMACList1,
HMACList2
Lists of supported hashing al-
gorithms.
EncList1, En-
cList2
Lists of encryption algo-
rithms.
SrvID Service ID, which uniquely
identifies the service.
SubID User subscription ID,
uniquely identify the sub-
scriber to the SP.
ADname Access Domain name, defin-
ing the domain name of the
access network.
SrvCookies The Cookies, sent by the
sever to the MT, these cook-
ies limit replay and DoS at-
tacks.
Vector1 r1,HMACList1,EncList1.
Vector2 r2,HMACList2,EncList2.
ASKey Association key ASKey = F2
(Srvkey, Vector1, Vector2).
Ackm Authentication Token Ackm
= F (SubID, SrvID, times-
tamp) used as an acknowl-
edgement messages to indi-
cate the completion of the
AKA process.
with the characteristics of its access network is kept by
the Central A3C (CA3C) in the Core-End Point (CEP).
Also, as described in section 6, for each subscribed
service, the CA3C will derive a service key Srvkey=
F1(UK, SrvID, SubID, lifetime) and passes it to the
SP. However, sharing the SrvKey between the MT and
the SP is not part of the SL-AKA protocol. Therefore,
the SL-AKA protocol considers the SrvKey to be pre-
shared between the SP and the MT. This key will be
used to derive the Association Key (ASKey) to secure
the connection between the SP and the MT. By con-
sidering the notations in Table 3, the SL-AKA runs as
follows:
As shown in Figure 6, the SL-AKA is initiated when
the Mobile Terminal (MT) indicates to the CA3C its in-
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Fig. 6 The Initial SL-AKA Protocol
tention to access the service provider (SP). The CA3C
server knows the services’ subscription IDs as well as
the corresponding MT’s preferences in terms of security
and QoS which are part of the Service Level of Agree-
ment (SLA) stored in the CA3C server. The CA3C
server passes the MT’s preference as a vector of in-
formation (Vector1), which contains lists of MT’s pre-
ferred encryption and hashing algorithms (Enclist) and
(HMACList) respectively. Additionally, it contains a
fresh random value (r1) to maintain the vector fresh-
ness.
This vector along with the domain name of the MT’s
access network and the MT’s SubID are passed to the
Service Provider (SP) as messages 1,2 and 3. Once, the
SP receives message 3, it derives the Association Key
ASKey = F2 (Srvkey(SP), Vector1, Vector2).
Msg1 : CA3C → DesDA3C : V ector1, SubID,
ADname
Msg2 : DesDA3C → DesAuth : V ector1, SubID,
ADname
Msg3 : DesAuth → SP : V ector1, SubID,ADname
Generate the ASKey= F2 (Srvkey(SP), Vector1, Vec-
tor2)
Based on the MT’s preference in Vector1, the SP con-
structs Vector2 which represents the SP preferences in
terms of encryption and hashing algorithms (EncList2),
(HMACList2) -this negotiation stage will be discussed
later in section 6.1.1. In message 4, the SP sends Vec-
tor2 and server cookies (SrvCookies) to the MT. These
cookies will be used as a challenge and to stop re-play
attacks.
Msg4 : SP → MT : {V ector2, SrvCookies}Srvkey(SP )
Generate the ASKey= F2 (Srvkey(SP), Vector1, Vec-
tor2)
Message 4 is encrypted using the pre-shared service key
SrvKey(SP) between the MT and the SP. Therefore, the
MT will decrypt the message to get Vector2 and derive
the ASKey. The MT retrieves the nonce number (r2)
from the received Vector2, uses the derived ASKey to
encrypt message 5, which includes the server’s cookies
and r2. Upon receiving message 5, the SP verifies the
message’s contents to ensure that it contains the valid
values for the SrvCookies and r2. In case of a successful
verification, the SP acknowledges the successful authen-
tication by composing the acknowledgement message
(Msg6)
Msg5 : MT → SP : {r2, SrvCookies}ASKey
Verify the message contents
Msg6 : SP → MT : {Ackm}ASKey
6.1.1 The Negotiation Stage
At this stage, we presumed that, each time the user
subscribes to a new service, an identity-based authen-
tication token is generated by the MT and the SP.
This token is used in the protocol as an acknowledge-
ment Ackm=F(SubID, SrvID, timestamp) to indicate
authentication completion and for achieving identity
authentication as explained in the SL-AKA Analysis
section 6.1.4. In Msg1, the CA3C provides the SP with
a list of the supported hashing and encryption algo-
rithms by the MT; it also contains the domain name
of the MT’s access network. The reason for including
the network domain name is to allow the SP to specify
its security level with regards to the credibility of the
MT’s access network.
Three major factors define network’s credibility: the
network security level in terms of the efficiency of the
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authentication and encryption mechanisms, geographi-
cal location of the MT’s access network; some services
might choose not to accept access requests from cer-
tain countries or domains, which are considered inse-
cure. The third factor is the access network technology
(WiFi, 2G, 3G. etc), this factor has to do with making
the SP aware of the access network’s characteristics in
terms of QoS range and coverage which are important
to consider in case of handover. Taking these factors
into account, the SP specifies three modes of access net-
works: low, normal and high credibility networks and as
a result the SP re-orders its own hashing and encryp-
tion lists (HMACList2, EncList2) and sends them to
the MT as part of the Vector2.
This way, in addition to its lists, each end has the
other end’s lists. In the case of HMAC lists for instance,
each end takes the first suggested algorithms in the
SP’s list (HMACList2) and looks it up in the MT’s list
(HMACList1), if no match found, it takes the second
suggested algorithm in list2 and looks it up in list1, then
the third and so on. The first match is considered as the
adopted hashing algorithm. The same procedure is fol-
lowed for choosing the session encryption algorithm.
6.1.2 The SL-AKA Formal Verification
The goal of the proposed SL-AKA protocol is to achieve
mutual authentication and set a secure connection be-
tween the MT and SP. To model the AKA protocol us-
ing Casper/FDR tool, we prepared a Casper input file
that represents the system. The complete description
of the protocol is found in Appendix 8, for conciseness
only the # Processes, the # Specification and the # In-
truder Information headings are shown here, while the
rest are of a less significance in terms of verifying the
protocol.
The # Protocol Description section describes the
protocol as a sequence of the messages exchanged be-
tween the participants. The notation {m}{k} implies
that the message (m) is encrypted using the key (k).
Also, m%w denotes that the recipient of the message is
not supposed to understand the message (m) instead;
he should store it in a variable (w) and pass it. In con-
trast, the notation w%mmeans that recipient should be
able to encrypt the message (m), stored in the variable
(w).
The # Processes heading shows the process in the
system, where each participant is represented by a sin-
gle process. Our system comprises five processes: The
MT represented by the INITIATOR process, the Desti-
nation Authenticator (DesAuthenticator) process cor-
responds to the DesAuth; the DesAAASERVER pro-
cess represents the Destination AAA server; the last two
processes namely, the CentralSERVER and Responder
represent the CA3C in the core end point and the SP.
For each process, the parameters- in the brackets- define
the agents’ initial knowledge before running protocol.
# Processes
INITIATOR(MT, Ackm, r1, Vector1, SubID, ADname)
knows Srvkey(SP)
DesAuthenticator(DesAuth, SP, DesDA3C, AuthReq,
Adv, AccRes)
DesAAASERVER(DesDA3C,CA3C,DesAuth)
CentralSERVER( CA3C, DesDA3C, Vector1, SubID,
ADname)
RESPONDER(SP, MT, DesAuth, DesDA3C, r2, Vector2,
SrvCookies, Ackm) knows Srvkey(SP)
The security requirements of the system are defined
under the # Specification heading. The lines starting
with the keyword Secret define the secrecy properties
of the protocol. The Secret(SP,ASKey,[MT]) specifies
the ASKey as a secret between the MT and the SP. The
lines starting with Agreement define the protocol’s au-
thenticity properties; for instance Agreement(SP, MT,
[ASKey]) specifies that, the SP is correctly authenti-
cated to the MT using the key ASKey. The Aliveness
assertion checks the availability of the participants, e.g.
WeakAgreement(SP,MT) assertion could be interpreted
as follows: if MT has completed a run of the protocol
with SP, then SP has previously been running the pro-
tocol, apparently with MT.
# Specification
Secret(SP,ASKey,[MT])
Secret(MT,ASKey,[SP])
Secret(SP,SrvCookies,[MT])
Agreement(SP,MT,[ASKey])
Agreement(MT,SP,[ASKey, SrvCookies])
WeakAgreement (SP, MT)
WeakAgreement (MT, SP)
The # Intruder Information heading specifies the In-
truder identity, knowledge and capability. The first line
identifies the Intruder as Mallory, the Intruder Knowl-
edge defines the Intruder’s initial knowledge i.e. we as-
sume the intruder knows the identity of the partici-
pants.
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {mt, desDA3C, ca3c, authID,
F2}
Crackable = ServiceSpecificKeys
After generating the CSP description of the systems
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using Casper and asking FDR to check the security as-
sertions, no attacks were found against any of the as-
sertions.
6.1.3 Security Considerations
Due to the fact that the security of the proposed pro-
tocol is based on the secrecy of the derived keys Srvkey
and ASKey, this section will discuss all the possible
threat models against the secrecy of the keys.
1. The Secrecy of the Unique Key UK: The pro-
posed SL-AKA protocol complies with the security
design of the AKA protocols of current systems such
as 2G and 3G networks, which presume a secret key
is brunet onto the SIM card of the mobile terminal
and is shared with the network operator. The secret
key will exclusively be used to derive further key
and thus will not be exposed. The SL-AKA proto-
col refers to this secret key as the Unique Key (UK)
and uses it to derive the Servkey.
2. The Secrecy of the Service Key (Srvkey): The
Srvkey is derived by the MT and the CA3C from the
UK as follows: Srvkey= F1(UK,SrvID, SubID, Life-
time). The secrecy of this key is very crucial for the
overall security of the protocol, because exposing
this key will lead to exposing the derived key As-
sociation Key (ASKey). Therefore, this key should
be transferred securely from the CA3C to the SP.
This emphasises on the need to secure the commu-
nication between the entities in core network, which
has been discussed and addressed as part of the
Network-Level AKA protocol presented in [5].
It is worth pointing out that unlike the AKA protocol of
GSM an UMTS, where the key derivation functions of
the derived key were kept secret, our proposed protocol
presumes that the derivation function of the ASKey
(F2) is known to the Intruder.
Furthermore, the proposed protocol works at the
service or the application level, this means that it could
operate with any security protcol at the network layer
including the IP Security (IPSec) or EAP-based au-
thentication protocols [40] [41].
6.1.4 Security Analysis Based on the Security
Requirements List
To give a deep analysis of the security features of the
SL-AKA protocol, this section discusses who the initial
SL-AKA protocol meets the desired security require-
ments, explained in section 5.2.
1. Mutual Entity Authentication:
Similar to the UL-AKA protocol, this security prop-
erty is achieved, using the Authentication Token
Ackm=F(SubID, SrvID, timestamp) which has been
generated based on the parties’ IDs.
2. Mutual Key Authentication:
The mutual authentication between the MT and the
SP is based on the secrecy of the derived session key
Srvkey(SP). We got Casper to check this using the
Secret (SP, Srvkey(SP),[MT]) assertion check.
3. Mutual Key Confirmation:
This property is met by performing the check, using
the Decryptable function after Msg9 and 10 in the
Protocol Description heading Appendix 8 . By us-
ing the Decryptable function each party makes sure
that, the valid key is possessed by the other part. If
any of the check failed the protocol aborts.
4. Key Freshness: Since Casper does not have any func-
tion to check this property, The freshness of the As-
sociation key ASKey is guaranteed by including Vec-
tor 1 and 2 in its Key Generation Function (KGF)
ASKey= F2(Srvkey(SP), Vector1, Vector2). These
vectors comprise two fresh random values r1 and r2;
thus, a new ASKey is derived for each session. Since
Casper does not detect any attack on the secrecy
of the ASKey, this implies that key freshness is not
violated.
5. Unknown-Key Share resilience:
This requirement could be met by making a bind
between the derived key and the parties’ identi-
ties. This is considered by including the SrvKey in
the deriving function of the ASKey; the SrvKey in-
volves the SubID and SrvID in its derivation func-
tion: Srvkey= F1(UK, SrvID, SubID, lifetime). Casper
verifies this property by using the WeakAgreement
assertion in the Specification heading.
6. Key Compromise Impersonation Resilience: We mod-
elled this requirement by specifying the long-term
keys as crackable and using the Agreement asser-
tion to check any breach of the authenticity feature.
However, this property will be analysed in more de-
tailed in the following subsection.
6.1.5 Analysing the Key Compromise Impersonation
Resilience property:
The key mentioned after the Crackable keyword will
be compromised and passed to the intruder when all
agents whose runs overlap in time with any agent us-
ing that key have finished their runs [15]. Our proposed
protocol was not vulnerable to this attack, due to the
fact that there was no overlapping among the agents’
runs. However, to be very exhaustive, we simulate the
case when the Intruder has managed to compromise the
Srvkey(SP)- either in a previous run or in the current
one-. By adding the Srvkey(SP) to the Intruder Knowl-
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edge as shown below:
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {mt, desDA3C, ca3c, authID,
F2, Srvkey(SP)}
Crackable = ServiceSpecificKeys
The following attack has been discovered:
0. ca3c -> I desDA3C : VECTOR1, SUBID, ADNAME
2. I desAuth -> sp : VECTOR1, SUBID, ADNAME
3a. sp -> I mt : {R2, VECTOR2, SRVCookies}
{Srvkey(sp)}
3b. I sp -> mt : {R2, VECTOR2, SRVCookies}
{Srvkey(sp)}
4. mt -> I sp : {R2, SRVCookies}{ASKey}
5. I sp -> mt : {ACKM}{ASKey}
The intruder knows ASKey
Where the notations I mt, I desDA3C, I SP repre-
sent the Intruder impersonating the MT, the DesDA3C
and the SP, respectively. The attack is against the se-
crecy of the secret key ASKey and it leads to compro-
mising the Agreement(SP, MT,[ASKey]. As a result,
the MT believes it has completed a run of the protocol,
taking role INITIATOR, with the SP, using data items
ASKey while in reality it has been running the protocol
with the Intruder instead.
6.2 Light Weight SL-AKA Protocol for Handover
When the MT performs handover and changes its point
of attachment, the new access network might of a dif-
ferent credibility level. There is a need to consider these
changes by re-negotiating the security parameters and
deriving a new Association Key (NewASKey) to secure
the connection between the MT and the SP.
However, there is a need not to interrupt the on-
going service; therefore, the re-negotiation process in
the proposed SL-AKA protocol starts before the MT
actually moves to the new network, and hence, the
NewASKy is derived by the MT and SP prior to the
handover. Furthermore, since the MT and SP have al-
ready authenticated each other, the new fast re- authen-
tication will be based on the previous authentication.
The light weight SL-AKA protocol goes as follows:
When the MT sends a handover request to a new do-
main, the CA3C will send the domain name of the
new network towards the SP as in messages 1,2 and
3. When the SP receives this information, it re-orders
the HMACList2 and the EncList2 to suit the new char-
acteristics of the network, and thus the SP will have a
different value of the Vector2. The SP will also use the
old Association Key (OldASKey) to derive the new one:
NewASKey = F2(OldASKey, V ector1, V ector2).
Msg1 : CA3C → DesDA3C : ADname
Msg2 : DesDA3C → DesAuth : ADname
Msg3 : DesAuth → SP : ADname
Generate the NewASKey= F2 (OldASKey , Vector1,
Vector2)
The SP sends the new vector (Vector2) to the MT
as message 4, which is encrypted using the OldASKy.
Only the MT can decrypt this message to retrieve Vec-
tor2, which will be used by the MT to generate the
NewASKey. The MT acknowledges the the successful
derivation by sending an encrypted acknowledgement
using the NewASKey.
Msg4 : SP → MT : {V ector2}OldASKey
Generate the NewASKey= F2 (OldASKey , Vector1,
Vector2)
Msg5 : MT → SP : {Ackm}NewASKey
6.2.1 Formal Verification
Since the light weight SL-AKA protocol is based on the
initial SL-AKA, it will meet the same desired security
features such as the ones in section 5.2. This has been
proven by Casper/FDR which found no attacks against
the light weight SL-AKA. The full Casper/FDR de-
scription of the protocol is in Appendix 9.
Furthermore, in order to analyse the Key Compro-
mise Impersonation Resilience property, we simulate
the case when the Intruder knows the previous secret
key (OldASKey) and checked for the secrecy of the
newly derived one (NewASKey).
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {mt, desDA3C, ca3c, authID,
F, oldASKey}
No attack was found as shown in Fig 7.
7 Conclusion
This article discussed several research efforts, which
have been trying to address the issue of authenticating
the mobile nodes to end servers in heterogeneous envi-
ronment. The discussion showed that most of the solu-
tions failed to realize the threats resulting from the open
nature of future networks and to consider the power
and processing restriction of mobile devices. Therefore,
a novel Service-Level AKA protocol is introduced in
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Fig. 7 Casper/FDR Verification
this paper, the proposed protocol provides mutual au-
thentication and sets up a secure connection between
the mobile terminal and the service provider. The pro-
tocol considers the initial authentication as well as the
case of a handover, and it has been verified using formal
method approach.
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8 Code for Formal Analysis of the Proposed
Initial SL-AKA Protocol
# Free Variables
MT: Agent
SP : Service
DesAuth : DesAccessRouterAuthenticator
DesDA3C : DesDomainA3CServer
CA3C : CentralA3CServer
r1, r2 : Nonce
ADname : AccessDomainname
Srvkey :Service -> ServiceSpecificKeys
F: ServiceSpecificKeys x Vectors x Vectors ->
AssociationKeys
SubID : ServiceSubscribtionID
ASKey : AssociationKeys
Vector1,Vector2:Vectors
SrvCookies: Cookies
Ackm : AcknowledgementMessage
InverseKeys = (Srvkey, Srvkey), (ASKey,ASKey),
(F,F)
# Processes
INITIATOR(MT,Ackm,r1,Vector1, SubID,ADname)
knows Srvkey(SP)
DesAuthenticator(DesAuth,SP,DesDA3C)
DesAAASERVER(DesDA3C,CA3C,DesAuth)
CentralSERVER(CA3C, DesDA3C,Vector1,SubID,
ADname)
RESPONDER(SP, MT, DesAuth, DesDA3C, r2, Vector2,
SrvCookies, Ackm)
knows Srvkey(SP)
# Protocol Description
0. CA3C -> DesDA3C: Vector1, SubID, ADname
1. DesDA3C -> DesAuth: Vector1, SubID, ADname
2. DesAuth -> SP : Vector1, SubID, ADname
< ASKey := F (Srvkey(SP ), V ector1, V ector2) >
3. SP -> MT : {r2, Vector2, SrvCookies}
{Srvkey(SP)}
< ASKey := F (Srvkey(SP ), V ector1, V ector2) >
4. MT -> SP : {r2, SrvCookies}{ASKey}%v1
[decryptable(v1, ASKey)andnth(decrypt
(v1, ASKey), 1) == SrvCookies]
5. SP -> MT : {Ackm}{ASKey}%w3
[decryptable(w3, ASKey)andnth(decrypt
(w3, ASKey), 1) == Ackm]
# Specification
Secret(SP,ASKey,[MT])
Secret(MT,ASKey,[SP])
Secret(SP,SrvCookies,[MT])
Agreement(SP,MT,[ASKey])
Agreement(MT,SP,[ASKey, SrvCookies])
WeakAgreement (SP, MT)
WeakAgreement (MT, SP)
# Actual Variables
mt, Mallory: Agent
desAuth : DesAccessRouterAuthenticator
desDA3C : DesDomainA3CServer
sp : Service
ca3c : CentralA3CServer
R1, R2 : Nonce
ADNAME : AccessDomainname
VECTOR1,VECTOR2: Vectors
SRVCookies: Cookies
SUBID : ServiceSubscribtionID
ACKM : AcknowledgementMessage
ASKEY : AssociationKeys
InverseKeys = (ASKEY,ASKEY)
# Functions
symbolic Srvkey, F
# System
INITIATOR(mt, ACKM, R1, VECTOR1, SUBID, ADNAME)
DesAuthenticator(desAuth, sp, desDA3C)
DesAAASERVER(desDA3C, ca3c, desAuth)
CentralSERVER(ca3c, desDA3C, VECTOR1, SUBID,
ADNAME)
RESPONDER(sp, mt, desAuth, desDA3C, R2, VECTOR2,
SRVCookies, ACKM)
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {mt, desDA3C, ca3c, authID,
F}
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9 Code for Formal Analysis of the Light
Weight SL-AKA Protocol For Handover
# Free Variables
MT: Agent
SP : Service
DesAuth : DesAccessRouterAuthenticator
DesDA3C : DesDomainA3CServer
CA3C : CentralA3CServer
r1, r2 : Nonce
ADname : AccessDomainname
Srvkey :Service -> ServiceSpecificKeys
F: ServiceSpecificKeys x OldAssociationKeys
x Vectors x Vectors -> NewAssociationKeys
SubID : ServiceSubscribtionID
NewASKey : NewAssociationKeys
OldASKey : OldAssociationKeys
Vector1,Vector2: Vectors
SrvCookies: Cookies
Ackm : AcknowledgementMessage
InverseKeys = (Srvkey, Srvkey),
(NewASKey,NewASKey), (OldASKey,OldASKey) ,(F,F)
# Processes
INITIATOR(MT, Ackm,r1,Vector1, SubID,ADname,
OldASKey) knows Srvkey(SP)
DesAuthenticator(DesAuth,SP,DesDA3C)
DesAAASERVER(DesDA3C,CA3C,DesAuth)
CentralSERVER( CA3C, DesDA3C,Vector1,SubID, ADname)
RESPONDER(SP, MT, DesAuth, DesDA3C, r2, Vector2,
SrvCookies, Ackm, OldASKey) knows Srvkey(SP)
# Protocol Description
0. CA3C -> DesDA3C:Vector1, SubID,ADname
1. DesDA3C -> DesAuth:Vector1, SubID,ADname
2. DesAuth -> SP : Vector1, SubID,ADname
< NewASKey := F (Srvkey(SP ), OldASKey,
V ector1, V ector2) >
3. SP -> MT : {Vector2}{OldASKey}
< NewASKey := F (Srvkey(SP ), OldASKey,
V ector1, V ector2) >
4. MT -> SP : {Ackm}{NewASKey}
# Specification
Secret(SP,NewASKey,[MT])
Secret(MT,NewASKey,[SP])
Secret(SP,SrvCookies,[MT])
Agreement(SP,MT,[OldASKey])
Agreement(MT,SP,[Ackm])
WeakAgreement (SP, MT)
WeakAgreement (MT, SP)
# Actual Variables
mt, Mallory: Agent
desAuth : DesAccessRouterAuthenticator
desDA3C : DesDomainA3CServer
sp : Service
ca3c : CentralA3CServer
R1, R2 : Nonce
ADNAME : AccessDomainname
VECTOR1,VECTOR2: Vectors
SRVCookies: Cookies
SUBID : ServiceSubscribtionID
ACKM : AcknowledgementMessage
InverseKeys = (newASKey,newASKey)
,(oldASKey,oldASKey)
newASKey : NewAssociationKeys
oldASKey : OldAssociationKeys
# Functions
symbolic Srvkey, F
# System
INITIATOR(mt, ACKM, R1, VECTOR1, SUBID, ADNAME,
oldASKey)
DesAuthenticator(desAuth, sp, desDA3C)
DesAAASERVER(desDA3C, ca3c, desAuth)
CentralSERVER( ca3c, desDA3C, VECTOR1, SUBID, ADNAME)
RESPONDER(sp, mt, desAuth, desDA3C, R2, VECTOR2,
SRVCookies, ACKM, oldASKey)
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {mt, desDA3C, ca3c, authID,
F}
